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Death With Dignity: 
A Roman Catholic Perspective 
by 
Thomas R. Kopfensteiner 
The author is Associate Professor of Theology at Fordham University in New 
York. 
The question of a dignified death is raised anew against the advancements in 
medical technology that provide the means to maintain human life. There is fear 
that in face of technology the possibility for a dignified death maybe diminished. 
Protecting human dignity means being able to remove medicine's unnatural 
obstacles to death. The focus of the discussion, however, is not to assume that a 
"natural" death is more worthy of the human person. That is clearly a naive 
position; not providing available medical means to a suffering person may 
certainly compromise human dignity as much as the excessive use of those 
means. The discussion, rather, has turned on freedom's ability to choose the 
manner and time of one's death. Can the freedom that persons enjoy over nature 
be extended even to the time and manner of death? Can the self-disposing of 
human life ever be a reasonable, responsible, and dignified act or does it 
necessarily entail an encroachment of God's dominion over life? 
The purpose of this article is to delineate the meaning of a dignified death 
within the Roman Catholic moral tradition including some of the Magisterium's 
most recent statements. Providing a more accurate hermeneutic of what 
constitutes a dignified death will expand the discussion beyond the demand of 
human autonomy and freedom from excessive or futile technology. From a 
Catholic perspective, a dignified death will include the knowledge that death is 
approaching and one's treatment choices will be respected, the confidence that 
one will not suffer useless pain or be abandoned by friends and family, and the 
opportunity to be reconciled with one's life project. 
Before deconstructing the meaning of a dignified death, some observations can 
be made concerning the character of Christian morality. These considerations 
will provide the background from which to approach the issue of death with 
dignity as it confronts contemporary society. 
First, Christian morality is not understood as a system of prescriptions and 
proscriptions requiring the submissive obedience of the believer. Moral norms 
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are not ends in themselves but reveal a conception of human flourishing and 
dignity which they tacitly embody; norms are messengers of the meaning of 
human flourishing. In this way, moral norms have a prophylactic role. Like the 
walls of a medieval city which guaranteed the protection of the citizens, moral 
norms protect an underlying vision of human dignity which does not exclude 
suffering, self-sacrifices, or solidarity with those in need. This vision or horizon is 
the hermeneutical key to unlock the meaning of the behavior a norm proscribes 
or prescribes. This horizon which contains assumptions about human life, 
suffering, and death is specified, extended, and deciphered through moral 
reasoning and the pastoral practice of the Church. In a way, this horizon provides 
the background grammar which structures meaningful discourse about a human 
and dignified death. To forget that the inner-worldly behavior sanctioned or 
prohibited by a moral norm embodies a more original vision of human 
flourishing is to work with a truncated notion of the reasoning process. 
Secondly, moral norms cannot be limited to prescriptive language - what we 
should and should not do - but must open up to the narrative language of the 
community. When speaking about the topic of euthanasia (literally a "good" or 
"easy" death) this characteristic of the moral norm has a particular importance. 
In face of human suffering and the experience of death, normative language gives 
way to the invitation to enter into solidarity with a brother or sister in need. The 
compassion and care of the believing community for the sick and dying will be an 
eloquent testimony to the meaning of Christian living. The compassion and 
solidarity with those facing their fragility and mortality will be evidence to the 
communitarian character of Christian ethics. 
1. Christian Anthropology and Moral Reasoning 
The starting point for Christian moral reasoning is reason illuminated by faith 
(DS. 3006). The introduction of a religious voice to the discussion on euthanasia 
does not mean a simplistic or naive use of Scripture. The tradition of natural law 
argumentation guards against any moral proscription being grounded on biblical 
authority (Gen. 9:6; Dt. 5:17). The autonomous nature of moral reasoning 
protects the moral law from being imposed heteronomously by even a divine 
authority.) Faith does not replace the need for study and reflection; faith does not 
suppress our rational capabilities. Nevertheless, any conception of moral 
reasoning that is sensitive to the exigencies of contemporary philosophy will 
understand the autonomy of moral reasoning as a relational autonomy. This 
means that as informed by faith, moral reasoning is always embedded in a more 
original narrative or context. The creed is effective at this deeper level. What we 
profess and believe ([utes quae) acts as a presupposition to our reason in a way 
that it conditions and stimulates reason. Our faith sensitizes reason to perceive 
moral values. This approach is seen most clearly in the new Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services where the Bishops introduce the 
individual chapters with a narrative that "provides the context in which concrete 
issues can be discussed from the perspective of the Catholic faith." Only then 
are the directives given " which promote and protect the truths 
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of the Catholic faith as those truths are brought to bear on concrete issues in 
health care."2 
There are a number of presuppositions that stem from the Christian creed and 
which come into play in the discussion surrounding our obligations to the sick 
and dying. While not providing any concrete norm, these presuppositions help 
identify relevant problems and point the direction in which moral reflection will 
go to find adequate solutions. They constitute the cognitive matrix in which 
moral reasoning works. 
First, there is the recognition of the indestructible dignity of the person. The 
religious warrant for human dignity is the creation account in Genesis I :26 where 
humankind is created in the image of God. Human dignity is not merited; it 
cannot be forfeited by sin; it is not diminished by sickness; it cannot be revoked by 
society or the will of the individual. Human dignity entails a respect for another 
that frees her from the fear of any kind of arbitrary manipulation by others. 
Secondly, there is the recognition of the equality of all persons. The warrant for 
this claim is the Incarnation where, by becoming us, Christ renders us equal (Gal. 
3:28). The Incarnation also gives a new quality to human solidarity. God's 
nearness to us is shown in our willingness to draw near to each other. 
A third presupposition that will guide the moral practice of the Christian 
community is the conviction that death is not a catastrophe to be avoided at all 
costs. For the Christian death is not an insoluble puzzle. Christ's death has put 
death to death (1 Cor. 15:56). His resurrection has removed the veil of absurdity 
from human history. Through death the Christian enters eternal life (Rom. 6:23). 
Belief in the resurrection anchors the Christian's sense of hope in the face of 
suffering and death. Because death is anticipated and integrated into one's daily 
life, the Christian can embrace death serenely as the culmination of life. 
2. Teaching and Practice of the Church 
Within the Catholic tradition, life is a fundamental good. Life is the basis for 
the enjoyment for all other hman goods. At the same time, because life is not an 
absolute good, it need not be maintained at all costs or by all technological means 
available. 
What is proscribed absolutely by the Church is "an action or an omission 
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this 
way be eliminated."3 In condemning the direct killing of oneself or another 
because that life is seen as absurd, the Catholic tradition also recognizes that death 
must not be staved off at all costs. Even within a theological anthroplogy that 
integrates suffering into the mystery of Christ's death and resurrection, the 
Catholic tradition recognizes that suffering can become futile, excessive, and 
offensive to human dignity; the tradition does not degenerate into a cult of 
suffering. Catholic normative reasoning moves between these two extremes: 
human life is never regarded as meaningless even in its final and most vulnerable 
stages, but the technology used to maintain human life can be regarded at times as 
meaningless or useless. 
The Christian affirmation of life and the recognition of the appropriateness of 
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death stand behind the Church's traditional nomenclature of extraordinary and 
ordinary means of treatment to maintain life.4 The obligation to utilize ordinary 
means of treatment implies that an individual may forgo or omit treatment 
procedures when the burdens outweigh the benefits. The Declaration on 
Euthanasia nuanced the traditional terminology when it spoke of proportionate 
and disproportionate means of medical treatment. This is also the language used 
in the new Catechism and the new Directives.5 Whatever the language, however, 
the criterion for determining proportionate and disproportionate means is the 
integral well-being of the patient. Means of life support are proportionate or 
disproportionate relative to the condition of the patient. In the traditional 
manuals of moral theology, a variety of factors were offered to guide the 
prudential judgment of the patient: the reasonable hope of recovery, the ability to 
interact in familiar surroundings, the bearable level of pain and discomfort, and 
the tolerable hardship or inconvenience entailed in the provision oflife support.6 
What is clear in the tradition is that the guiding criterion is not the state of 
medical science or technology alone. If that were the case, what is ordinary today 
was extraordinary yesterday, and what is extraordinary today will be ordinary 
tomorrow. Of course, technological advancements may imply new obligations. 
Advancements in the treatment of an illness obviously diminish the risks and 
burden involved and offer the hope of greater therapeutic benefits. In other 
words, the determination of proportionate or disproportionate means of 
treatment will be flexible. 
A subtle but real threat to the Catholic tradition is that society has come to 
understand the most advanced medical technology as ordinary and 
commonplace. Technology is taken for granted in a way that was unimaginable a 
generation ago. This attitude has the tendency to restrict rather than refine the 
retrieval of the Catholic moral tradition and its application in a contemporary 
context. In a technological society, the duty to maintain life can be equated with 
the use of all available technology to maintain life; death occurs when technology 
has reached its limit; death becomes a medical failure. But to use technology in an 
uncritical way - that is regardless of the patient's condition - is to make an idol of it 
and risks turning the patient into an object. Such a naive use of technology, 
ironically, will have the tendency to reinforce initiatives for physician-assisted 
suicide. As a reaction to an uncritical use of technology, initiatives for physician-
assisted suicide unfortunately will be interpreted as a way of safeguarding the 
patient from manipulation. Within the Roman Catholic tradition, the object of 
offering or withdrawing medical technology is to allow the dying to live their 
final stages of life with human and Christian dignity. 
To this end, what is offered to the patient cannot be limited to the technological 
or medical means to support life or relieve physical pain. "Assistance" offered to 
the sick and dying will include human solidarity and compassion (Lk.! 0:25-38). 
The goal of treatment is not merely to relieve pain, but to humanize suffering. The 
Willingness ofthe community to draw close to those who are dying broadens the 
moral discussion about a dignified death to include the interpersonal aspects of 
human suffering and care. This means that the measure of Christian praxis will 
not be the technology that can be offered to the suffering and dying, but the 
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compassion and love provided for those who experience in their suffering and 
dying the limitations of the human condition.7 The trust, love and support so 
necessary for human living is a necessity for human dying as well. As solitary as 
death will be, it does not mean that we should die alone. When disproportionate 
means of treatment are withdrawn or withheld, the dying patient is not 
abandoned; the logic guiding the obligation to humanize suffering shifts from 
therapy to care. 
In this context, the preparations that a dying person may make to take his own 
life or his request to have a physician or nurse remedy pain by terminating life 
-far from being an act of freedom or self-determination - can be interpreted as 
an "anguished plea for help and love."8 The challenge to the Christian 
community is to create the conditions wherein the person does not have to gain 
meaning by choosing death. There is a mutually conditioning relationship 
between law and culture. What we need are not merely laws prohibiting 
physician-assisted suicide, but we need to create what John Paul II has named in 
his recent Encyclical The Gospelo/Life, a "culture of life." We must see that the 
request to have one's life terminated by another can signal the moral failure ofthe 
community to support the dying in their last stages of life, and to provide meaning 
to the fragility of human existence. Such persons feel abandoned. In an 
environment where the dying experience themselves as isolated and far from 
human solidarity, and where they are not offered any purpose to their suffering, 
they are even more susceptible to suggestions of "physician assisted" suicide. 
When such a tragedy occurs, then, the moral condemnation should not be 
directed to the physician or the patient alone, but the community that has lost its 
sense of human solidarity with the weakest and most vulnerable members of 
society. 
The witness of religious communities of men and women provides a rich 
insight into the meaning of a dignified death. Health care communities of 
religious take time to gather with a dying sister and help her prepare for an 
impending death. Community members stay with her around the clock; they 
pray with her, and comfort her with Scripture, poetry and songs. The room ofthe 
dying becomes like a chapel. The others allow the dying sister the opportunity to 
take stock of life, to be forgiven her transgressions, and to make final farewells. 
The example of the religious teaches us that one should not fear the inevitable 
confrontation with death; one should fear, rather, being unprepared for death, 
dying unreconciled with one's life choices, and dying alone and isolated from 
human love. 
The witness of such religious communities introduce a necessary corrective 
into the discussion about the right to die which is often contextualized within the 
assumption that the freedom to choose is tantamount to human dignity. In its 
turn, this conception of freedom is based on a decidedly modern epistemology 
which emphasizes personal autonomy.9 Within this scheme, moral problems are 
defined in terms of the restrictions on freedom or the impairment of autonomy. 
The witness of the Christian community does not question the right to die; it 
questions the validity of the modern project which sees dependency on others and 
human dignity as antithetical. 
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The Church realizes that burdens of caring for a dying family member also 
must be taken into consideration when evaluating the means of treatment. Each 
family will face definite limits - not merely financial but psychological and 
moral - to the care that they can provide to a dying loved one. Here again is an 
opportunity for the community's support to humanize suffering in face of the 
growing technological possibilities to prolong life. Concretely, the hospice 
movement and parish nurse program are examples of care not only for the 
terminally ill, allowing the individual to remain in familial surroundings, but also 
examples of communal support for the families who otherwise would not be able 
to provide this kind of care on their own. By supporting these kinds of programs 
and initiatives, the ecclesial community can provide a high standard of care to be 
imitated. A Christian ethic will be characterized by its sensitivity to those who 
suffer; the sick and dying should find a privileged place within the Christian 
community. The Christian vision of human dignity not only includes the ability 
to accept suffering and to transform it by the light of faith, but also the ability to 
bear the sufferings of one another generously and compassionately. 
Excessive expense to the family or community can also be a factor in judging 
certain means to be extraordinary or disproportionate. An individual has a 
responsibility not to invest the financial resources of the family in treatment or 
technology disproportionate to the anticipated results. lo It oftens happens that 
when a family is not able to pay for a potentially beneficial treatment, public 
support is mobilized to assist the family. Such cases even may provoke the 
development of new criterion of resource allocation or new forms of health care 
delivery in order to prevent similar cases from becoming commonplace. Publicly 
established limits to medical treatment, however, must done in a way that does 
not entail the further marginalization of those most in need. 
3. The Professional-Patient Relationship 
The teaching of the Church underlines the fundamental right to life of every 
human person. II A person should be certain that the right to life is respected and 
that no one presumes the authority to abrogate it. The ethos of the medical 
profession is built around the obligation to maintain and protect human life. 
Upon this professional duty is built the patient's trust to receive medical care in a 
human and dignified way. Advancements in medical technology do not cast this 
professional duty into doubt; increasing technological control over human life in 
its most fragile and vulnerable moments, however, raises questions of the scope 
and limits of this duty. 
The duty to maintain life should not compromise other responsibilities that the 
physician has toward the patient. This means that the right to life does not exhaust 
the professional-patient relationship. The physician'S duty to maintain life is 
balanced with the duty to relieve pain, even when doing so will shorten the 
patient's lifeP Naturally, persons will have different levels of tolerance for 
physical pain, but no one is bound to a heroic measure of endurance. It is fully in 
accord with the Catholic tradition for a physician to administer analgesics to 
alleviate pain even though their administration may quicken the patient's death. 
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Though the phenomenal structure entails the taking of human life, the loss oflife 
does not exhaust the moral meaning of the act. The physician does not intend the 
death of the patient; the moral object of the act is pain control. This is an 
acceptable application of the traditional principle of the double effect. 
Effective pain management also enters into the discussion on physician-
assisted suicide. At this level of the discussion, the "right to die" no longer means 
the patient's freedom to relinquish disproportionate means, but the physician'S 
ability to help end the lives of ill patients suffering intolerably. In arguing by 
analogy, there is oftentimes a similarity drawn with the case of a fatally wounded 
soldier requesting to be shot in order to avoid a more agonizing death. 13 It is quite 
true that no one should suffer a physically painful death, but the tragedy of the 
mortally wounded soldier should not be over interpreted. In this case, the taking 
of life is done precisely because there are no other alternatives. The question is 
how comparable this case is to the contemporary medical situation? What are the 
relevant similarities to the professional-patient relationship? The purpose of 
effective pain management is to guarantee adequate relief to the dying. 
In addition to the duties to maintain life and to relieve pain, the physician has 
the responsibility to insure - as much as possible - that the dying patient remains 
conscious and aware of his or her surroundings. 14 The patient has the right to 
embrace death while still alert and cognizant. A dying patient should not be 
deprived of consciousness or the ability to communicate with care providers, 
family, or friends merely for the sake of prolonging life. This duty serves the 
humanization of an individual's suffering and protects the patient from an 
uncritical and abusive use of technology. 
The professional-patient relationship is a human relationship based on 
confidence and trust. The patient has the right to truthful information about his or 
her condition. The duty to provide this information will depend upon the ability 
of the patient to receive it. The responsibility to provide this information, 
however, does not fall upon the physician alone. The patient oftentimes will need 
emotional, psychological and spiritual support. Hence, there must be 
collaboration between health care providers, the family of the patient, and 
pastoral care providers. A patient unprepared for death may meet an unfavorable 
diagnosis and prognosis with anger, resistance and denial. Conversely, the more 
prepared a person is to face death, the easier will be the sharing of information 
about that person's condition. Learning the truth about one's condition will be 
experienced as a relief and an invitation to prepare for death. While the truth 
should be told to a patient in a compassionate and, at times, in a gradual way, to 
withhold the truth from a patient is a subtle hegemony over the patient; it is a 
form of paternalism. 
Knowing the truth of one's condition serves the individual's freedom. As the 
Bishops write, the information to which a patient is entitled includes "all 
reasonable information about the essential nature of the proposed treatment and 
its benefits; its risks, side-effects, consequences, and cost; and any reasonable and 
morally legitimate alternatives, including no treatment at all."15 This information 
will be the basis for the informed consent of the patient. The free and informed 
consent of the patient is to be respected. 
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Although the informed decision of the patient binds the physician, this does 
not mean that the physician is obligated to cooperate with the patient with 
treatment contrary to the physician's moral or professional standards. The 
physician preserves the right to her own conscience. 
4. Promoting Human Dignity in Cases of Doubt 
Cases of doubt are solved throguh what are known as moral systems. The 
moral systems provide the agent with the practical certainty needed to act in a 
responsible way. Among the various moral systems are probabilism and 
tutiorism. The moral system of probabilism holds that a solidly probable opinion 
is sufficient to solve the doubt in favor of liberty. The guiding principle is qui 
probabiliter agit prudenter agit. On the other hand, the moral system of tutiorism 
holds that in cases of doubt, even when there is an opinion for liberty, one acts 
responsibly when the safer course is followed. Where the fundamental good of 
life is concerned, as in the care for the dying, one proceeds in a tutioristic manner. 
Tutiorism, however, should not be understood naively or simplistically. 
Tutiorism does not mean that life must be protected and maintained at all costs. 
Tutiorism does not mean rigorism; it does not make the maintenance of human 
life absolute at the expense of other goods to be considered. Tutiorism refers to 
the certainty of diagnosis and prognosis so that health care decisions can serve the 
patient's right to die with human and Christian dignity. 
There is no doubt that in an emergency situation a physician will act in a 
prudent way by initiating treatment with the hope of its success. Yet the 
praesumptio cedit veritati and tretment may reach the limit of its purpose. When, 
for instance, continued treatment would only mean a miserable state of life, or 
put the patient in a state where she would not recognize family members or 
familiar surroundings, or life would be maintained in a permanently comatose 
state, a prudent and responsible course of action could be the withdrawal or 
withholding of treatment. This freedom need not be questioned in those cases 
when a patient is still competent to decide or when an individual has left explicit 
and written wishes to this effect in an advance medical directive. The more 
difficult case is when the wishes of the patient are unknown or when he is not 
competent; then the decision falls upon the family in consultation with health 
care providers. As the Bishops state, "decisions ... should be faithful to Catholic 
moral principles and to the person's intentions and values, or if the person's 
intentions are unknown, to the person's best interests."16 
5. Casuistry Surrounding a Recent Dilemma 
One question that has emerged recently is whether there are means of life 
support that are always to be provided regardless of the condition ofthe patient? 
Some Catholic bishops have addressed the issue of artificially administered 
nutrition and hydrationP All are guided by the Church's teaching prohibiting 
euthanasia. There is also universal agreement that hydration and nutrition are not 
morally obligatory when they bring no comfort to a patient who is imminently 
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dying or when the patient's body cannot assimilate them. There is no consensus, 
however, concerning whether it is morally permissible to withdraw artifically 
administered nutrition and hydration when the person is in a persistent vegetative 
state. In the recent Ethical and Religious Directives, the body of Bishops steer a 
cautious and middle course when they write, 
there should be a presumption in favor of providing nutrition and hydration to all 
patients, including patients who require medically assisted nutrition and hydration, as 
long as this is of sufficient benefit to outweigh the burdens involved to the patient. 18 
Rather than dispute the casuistry that surrounds this issue, it may be more 
helpful to recall recent studies on the relationship between language and 
thought. 19 Those studies have drawn attention to the fact that problem-setting 
precedes problem-solving in a way that draws attention to what is labeled "the 
cognitive function" of language. By looking at the language which sculptures a 
problem, or in this case, the metaphors we use to describe the person in a 
persistent vegetative state, the attention will shift from problem-solving to the 
cognitive taxonomy created by language which guides moral reasoning in 
weighing the burdens and benefits of treatment. 
Oftentimes, it is said that to remove nutrition and hydration from a person in a 
persistent vegetative state is to starve the person to death. There is a similarity 
drawn between the person in a persistent vegetative state and someone who is 
starving. This similarity erects a cognitive taxonomy. Clearly, if someone is 
starving the obligation is to provide food and water. How nutrition and hydration 
are provided is irrevelant. When the problem is confined to this metaphor, one 
may even have recourse to the social teaching of the Church to underline the 
obligation to provide food and water: "feed the man dying of hunger, because if 
you have not fed him you have killed him." Surely, this is the most emotional 
argument to provide nutrition and hydration to a patient in a persistent vegetative 
state. Within this metaphor, providing nutrition and hydration can be nothing 
other than a proportionate means to maintain life; withdrawing or withholding 
them can be nothing other than forcing the patient to die. Consequently,the 
meaning attributed to the act of withdrawing or withholding nutrition and 
hydration is strictly circumscribed: it can be nothing other than the direct killing 
of a patient through starvation and dehydration.20 
A second metaphor sees the persistent vegetative state as a mental 
impairment. 21 This is often used in tandem with the first conceptual schema. The 
person in a persistent vegetative state is severely disabled and unable to feed 
himself or herself. Within the conceptual horizon sketched by this metaphor, 
there is no morally relevant difference between a coma, dementia, a persistent 
vegetative state or any other disability. This language builds a conceptual schema 
in which to remove nutrition and hydration from a PVS patient is not only a form 
of neglect and abuse, but a form of discrimination against the disabled. Another 
element within this conceptual network is the strict difference between treatment 
and care: nutrition and hydration are normal care to be provided to every patient. 
Proponents of this schema point out that nutrition and hydration do not treat an 
illness but simply maintain life. To remove this ordinary care from a PVS patient is 
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to say that the life of the mentally impaired patient is expendable. There is no 
difference in the act of removing nutrition and hydration from an individual in a 
persistent vegetative state and the intention of killing the individual. Admittedly 
death is brought about by omitting nutrition and hydration, but such an omission 
is really euthanasia in its intent. 22 Thus to argue for the removal or withholding of 
nutrition and hydration from PVS patients is another step down the slippery 
slope leading to the active causing of death. 
No doubt, the conceptual schema set up by the metaphor which sees a 
persistent vegetative state as a disability is guided by the duty to maintain life. 
When tutiorism is invoked by this schema, the moral system means that one has 
the duty to maintain physical life. The use of technology is unchecked as long as it 
serves the continuation of physical life. Within this conceptual schema, because 
the good to be achieved is the maintenance of life, the inability of the patient to 
communicate or relate to one's surroundings is of little importance. 
Consequently, the burden of the gastrointestinal tube is minimized since it does 
not increase the physical suffering of the patient, can be monitored easily by a 
nurse or trained person, and is not expensive. 
The third possible metaphor sees patients in a persistent vegetative state as 
dying. This metaphor sets up a broader conceptual schema in which to weigh the 
benefits and burdens of treatment when compared with the other two 
metaphors.23 Within this context no one stage of the patient's condition is 
isolated, but the patient's diagnosis and prognosis are set on a continuum which 
moves from treatment aimed at recovery to the eventual futility of treatment 
aimed at protecting human dignity. On this continuum, the inability to relate and 
communicate with one's surroundings is a morally relevant factor in determining 
the burdens and benefits of treatment. When tutiorism is invoked within this 
topography, it refers to the certainty needed to diagnose a persistent vegetative 
state, not to the duty to maintain life irrespective of the patient's condition. Not as 
in the other schemata, this schema draws a clear line between a persistent 
vegetative state and both a coma and dementia, but the line is less clearly defined 
distinguishing care and treatment. This conceptual topography focuses less on 
what is provided than who receives it and why. 
When the patient in a persistent vegetative state is seen as dying, artificially 
assisted nutrition and hydration are not maintained simply because their removal 
would lead inevitably to death. The inevitability of death is not the determining 
criterion ofthe disproportionality of treatment. Rather, the criterion judging the 
proportionality of any treatment is the total well-being of the patient which 
cannot be divorced from one's convictions about a meaningful life and a dignified 
death. Against this background, technology is made to serve human ends which 
transcend the mere maintenance of physical life. Within this schema, providing a 
PVS patient with nutrition and hydration can be interpreted as burdensome by 
virtue of its permanence; life without treatment is judged better than life with 
treatment. 
Furthermore, within the conceptual schema that sees the patient as dying, the 
removing or withholding of nutrition and hydration takes on a new moral object. 
The purpose of the action must be clear; removing or withholding nutrition and 
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hydration is never done to leave the patient to die or to shorten the patient's life or 
to discriminate against the disabled; the moral object of the action is to remove 
from the patient a burdensome means of maintaining life. Removing treatment 
does not signal a callous abandonment of the patient but an acceptance of the 
human condition and the limits of meaningful treatment. 
Conclusion 
Though the "right to die" and "dying with dignity" have become political 
slogans, they also can be used to guide the pastoral practice of the Church. In the 
face of an unrelenting use of medical technology to maintain life, sometimes in 
the name of the sanctity of life, the Church must protect the right to die with 
human and Christian dignity. In an ecclesial context, however, the meaning of a 
dignified death is given a deeper meaning than simply the ability to be made dead 
by one's own choosing. Within the Catholic tradition, protecting a dignified 
death means that the dying need to be assured that their lives will not be 
arbitrarily shortened, that they will not have to suffer uselessly, that they will not 
be subject to unreasonable and burdensome therapies, that medical technology 
will be used for their integral well-being, that their free and informed decisions 
will be respected, and that they will not be marginalized or abandoned by the 
community in their dying. 
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